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Abstract
This study shows that in a standard one-sector neoclassical growth model, in which
money is introduced with a cash-in-advance constraint, zero nominal interest rates
are optimal. Milton Friedman argued in 1969 that zero nominal rates are necessary
for efficient resource allocation. This study shows that they are not only necessary
but sufficient. The study also characterizes the monetary policies that will
implement zero rates. The set of such policies is quite large. The only restriction
these policies must satisfy is that asymptotically money shrinks at a rate no greater
than the rate of discount.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Inaclassicessay,MiltonFriedman(1969,p.34)statesthat
only monetary policies that generate a zero nominal in-
terest rate will lead to optimal resource allocations. He ar-
gues that “it costs...n ophysical resources to add to real
cash balances,” and hence it follows that “the optimum
quantity of money . . . will be attained by a rate of price
deﬂation that makes the nominal rate of interest equal to
zero”(italicsinoriginal).Thisprescriptionofzeronominal
interest rates has come to be known as the Friedman rule.
Friedman’sargumentconvincinglyshowsthatzeronom-
inal interest rates are necessary for efficient resource al-
location. However, Friedman leaves three key questions
unanswered. First, are zero nominal interest rates not only
necessary, but sufficient to ensure an optimal allocation of
resources?Forexample,supposethereisaseverepricede-
ﬂation at the same time that nominal interest rates are zero.
Individuals might (inefficiently) lower their capital hold-
ings to take advantage of the high real rate of return of-
fered by money.
Second, what kinds of monetary policies implement ze-
ro nominal interest rates, in the sense that the policies are
consistent with the existence of an equilibrium with zero
nominal interest rates? If money growth and inﬂation rates
are equal in equilibrium, then one way to implement zero
nominal interest rates would seem to be to shrink the mon-
ey supply at the efficient rate of return on capital (net of
depreciation). Is this true? And, if so, is it the only possible
monetary policy that produces zero nominal interest rates?
Finally, we must confront the question of unique imple-
mentation. For a particular speciﬁcation of monetary pol-
icy, while there may be one equilibrium in which nominal
rates are always zero, there may also be one or more equi-
libria in which they are not. A central bank cannot force
individualstocoordinateonitsdesiredequilibriumifother,
lessdesirableequilibriaarepossible.Hence,wewouldlike
to know, What are the characteristics of monetary policies
which only implement zero nominal interest rates?
In this article, we use a simple economic model to ad-
dress these questions of optimality, implementation, and
unique implementation of monetary policy. The model is
a standard one-sector neoclassical growth model that has
one main friction: a cash-in-advance constraint that re-
quireshouseholdstousecashbalancesaccumulatedbefore
each period to buy consumption goods in that period.
1 The
cash-in-advance constraint is a simple way to motivate a
transactions demand for money: when interest rates are
positive,householdsdonotholdmoney asastoreofvalue,
but rather only because they need money to purchase con-
sumption goods. Similarly, the cash-in-advance constraint
isgenerallyviewedasa cleanwaytoincorporatethe quan-
tity theory of money into a decision-theoretic framework.
In particular, if nominal rates are positive, then in each pe-
riod, households hold only enough money to fund their
purchases of consumption goods in the next period. This
implies that (consumption) velocity is constant at one, so
theinﬂation rate inany period isequal to thedifference be-
tween the rates of money growth and consumption growth
(which is the essence of the quantity theory of money).
We ﬁrst use the model to assess the characteristics of
interest rates when monetary policy is optimal. The cash-
in-advance constraint implies that households have to wait
until next period to use their current wage earnings to buy
goods. Consequently, households equate their marginal
rate of substitution between consumption and leisure not
to their marginal product of labor, but rather to their mar-
ginal product of labor discounted by the time value of
money. We show that this wedge can be eliminated if and
only if the time value of money—that is, the nominal in-
terest rate—is zero in every period.
Next, we completely characterize the set of monetary
policy rules that implement zero nominal interest rates. In-
terestingly, the set is deﬁned only by the long-run behavior
of monetary policy; even extreme contractions and expan-
sionsofthemoneysupplyareconsistentwithzeronominal
interest rates as long as such movements do not last for an
inﬁnite amount of time. Correspondingly, in these equilib-
ria, real balances may vary considerably and, in fact, can
grow exponentially.
Finally, we show that, at least when households have
utility functions that are logarithmic in consumption and
additively separable in consumption and leisure, there is
a large set of policies that uniquely implement zero nom-
inal interest rates. An example of such a policy is one that
leads money to shrink for a ﬁnite number of periods at a
rate no slower than households’ psychic discount rate and
to shrink thereafter exactly at the psychic discount rate.
The intuitive explanation for this example is simple: if the
nominalinterestrateispositiveinanyperiodinthiskindof
economy,householdsholdonlyenoughmoneytobuytheir
desired level of consumption goods. Hence, if the nominal
interest rate is to be positive, then the rate of price deﬂation
has to equal the rate of money shrinkage; but this in turn
implies a nonpositive nominal interest rate.
Our results have a key theoretical implication. Most
economists’intuitionaboutthe(long-run)effectsofchang-
es in the supply of money is shaped by Friedman’s (1963
[1968, p. 39]) famous dictum that “inﬂation is always and
everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” Our main message
is that while inﬂation is a monetary phenomenon for any
suboptimalmonetarypolicy,inﬂationisentirelyarealphe-
nomenon for any optimal monetary policy (because the
rate of deﬂation equals the real rate of interest).
Our results also have a striking policy implication. Zero
nominalinterestratesareconsistentwithalargesetofmon-
etary policies. This means that the optimality of monetary
policy can be veriﬁed only by looking at interest rates, not
by looking at the growth rates of the money supply.
The Environment Without Money...
In this section, we set out the physical environment in
which agents interact, and we characterize efficient allo-
cations in that environment.
We consider an inﬁnite-horizon environment with a
continuum of identical households. Each household has a
unit of time in every period; this time can be split between
leisure lt and work nt. There is a single consumption good.
In period t, the typical household ranks streams of con-
sumption and leisure (ct+s,lt+s)
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The utility function u is strictly concave and continuously
differentiable and satisﬁes the conditions that uc(0,l)=¥
for all l and ul(c,0) = ¥ for all c.
At the beginning of period 1, there are k0 > 0 units of
capital. (All quantities are written in per capita terms.) Inperiod t, capital and labor can be used to produce output
according to the production function
(2) yt = f(kt−1,nt).
The production function f is continuously differentiable,
homogeneous of degree one, and concave.
Output yt can be split between consumption ct and in-
vestment xt:
(3) yt = ct + xt.
Capital accumulates according to this law of motion:
(4) kt = (1−d)kt−1 + xt.
Capital must satisfy the nonnegativity restriction that
(5) kt ³ 0.
Given this description of the environment, what is the
symmetricParetooptimalallocationofresources(inwhich







subject to the physical resource constraints:
(7) ct + kt £ f(kt−1,nt) + (1−d)kt−1
(8) kt ³ 0
(9) k0 given.
(Note that we have substituted out investment and output
in this representation of the planner’s problem.)
The unique optimum (ct,kt,nt)
¥
t=1 of the social planner’s
problemistheuniquesolutiontothefollowingsetofequa-
tions:
(10) ct + kt = f(kt−1,nt) + (1−d)kt−1
(11) ul,t = uc,tfn,t
(12) −uc,t + b(fk,t+1+1−d)uc,t+1 =0
(13) lim inft®¥b
tuc,tkt =0
(where lim inf represents the limit inﬁma, or the greatest
lower bounds). Here, and throughout the article, uc,t =
uc(ct,lt), ul,t=ul(ct,lt), fn,t = fn(kt−1,nt) and fk,t+1 = fk(kt,nt+1).
Henceforth, we use the term optimal allocation to refer
to the above unique solution to the social planner’s prob-
lem. We assume that the utility function u and the produc-
tion function f are such that the optimal allocation is glob-
ally stable: for any k0, the solution to the social planner’s
problem has the property that (ct,kt,nt) converges to a
strictly positive steady state (css,kss,nss)a stgoes to in-
ﬁnity.
. . . And With Money
Here we add to the physical environment just described a
particular monetary trading arrangement that households
use to allocate resources among themselves, and we char-
acterize the equilibria that arise under this arrangement for
different monetary policies. The key feature of the trading
arrangement is that households are required to use previ-
ously accumulated money balances to buy consumption
goods. This cash-in-advance feature generates a transac-
tions demand for money.
Money itself adds no new possibilities for resource re-
allocations to the environment, so no equilibrium with
money can make all households better off relative to the
optimal allocation characterized above. In fact, because
households must use a low-yield asset (money) for their
purchases of consumption goods, equilibrium allocations
are typically Pareto inferior to the above optimal alloca-
tions.
To describe the monetary trading arrangement, we ﬁrst
specify theownership of thevarious goods. Thereis a con-
tinuum of ﬁrms, each of which is endowed with a constant
returns-to-scale technology that allows the ﬁrm to produce
output according to the above production function (2).
Households begin life with equal claims to the proﬁts of
these ﬁrms. (In equilibrium, the proﬁts are zero, so we will
ignore them.)Householdsalsoowntheirtimeendowment,
k0 units of capital, and M0 units of money. Finally, there is
an entity called the government which can give money to
or take it from households. Before trade begins, the gov-
ernment speciﬁes a sequence of monetary taxes and trans-
fers {tt}
¥
t=1; this transfer sequence implies a sequence of
money supply levels by the accumulation equation
(14) Mt = tt + Mt−1.
Trading works as follows. Each household starts period
t with mt−1 units of money, bt−1 units of bonds, and kt−1
units of capital. At the beginning of the period, a competi-
tive goods market opens. Let money be the numeraire
good in this market. Firms buy labor at wage rate wt and
rent capital at rental rate rt from households and use these
inputs to produce consumption and investment goods.
Households buy consumption and investment goods from
ﬁrms at price pt.
In the goods market, households face two restrictions
on their ability to purchase goods. One is that households
do not receive their wage and rental payments until after
the goods market has closed. (This can be understood in-
tuitively: a ﬁrm cannot pay its workers until the ﬁrm has
sold its goods.) The other restriction is that households
cannot use credit or bonds to purchase consumption goods
(although households can use credit to buy investment
goods). These two restrictions together imply that all con-
sumption purchases have to be made using the original
money holdings mt−1. This restriction is termed a cash-in-
advance constraint; it is meant to capture the idea that
money can be used to buy more goods than can be bought
with credit.
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After the goods market closes, the asset market opens.
In the asset market, households receive 1 + it−1 units of
money for every unit of bonds with which they started the
period.Ahouseholdalsoreceivesitsnominallaborincome
wtnt and capital income rtkt−1 less its expenditures on new
capital ptxt and receives a net transfer of money from the
government tt. The household divides its nominal wealth
in the asset market among money holdings and one-period
bonds. Then the asset market closes, and the period ends.Given the trading arrangement, the problem of a rep-






(16) mt−1 ³ ptct
(17) mt + bt £ rtkt–1 + wtnt + bt−1(1+it−1)+m t −1 + tt
− pt(ct+xt)
(18) kt = (1−d)kt−1 + xt
(19) kt ³ 0, mt ³ 0, and bt ³ −B.
Thehousehold’sﬁrstconstraint(16)saysthatallconsump-
tion purchases must be ﬁnanced with cash brought into the
goods market. The second constraint (17) says that avail-
able wealth can be split between money and bonds in the
asset market. The third constraint (18) is the transition
equation for the capital stock (4). The last constraint (19)
guarantees that capital and money holdings are both non-
negative and imposes a lower bound on debt which rules
out Ponzi schemes in which the household borrows an ev-
er-increasing amount over time. We assume that B is suf-
ﬁciently large so that this constraint never binds in equilib-
rium.
We use the capital transition equation (18) to substitute
out for xt in the household’s budget constraint in the asset
market (17). We use µt and lt to denote the Lagrangian
multipliersonconstraints(16)and(17),respectively.Since
the household’s objective function is concave and its con-
straint set is convex, the household’s problem has a unique
solution.
This optimum is in turn the unique solution to the ﬁrst-
order conditions and the transversality conditions on the





tul,t − wtlt =0
(22) −lt + (1+it)lt+1 =0
(23) lt+1[rt+1 + (1−d)pt+1]−l tp t=0
(24) −lt +µ t +1 + lt+1 =0 .
These conditions ensure that in any solution to the house-
hold’sproblem,therearenoﬁnitelyliveddeviationswhich
are welfare-improving for the household. The transversal-
ity conditions consist of
(25) lim inft®¥ltptkt=0
(26) lim inft®¥lt(bt+B)=0
(27) lim inft®¥ltmt=0 .
Note that the transversality conditions are restrictions only
on the limit inﬁma of the relevant sequences, not on the
limits. [See the Appendix for a proof of the sufficiency of
these ﬁve ﬁrst-order conditions and the three (apparently
weak) transversality conditions.]
The problem of the representative ﬁrm is a sequence of
static maximization problems, since the ﬁrm simply seeks
tomaximizeproﬁtsineachperiodbyrentinglaborandcap-
ital to produce output which it sells to households. The
static problem of the ﬁrm, then, is to
(28) maxNt,Ktptf(Kt,Nt)−w tN t−r tK t.
The ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order conditions are
(29) ptfK,t = rt
(30) ptfN,t=wt.
Underthistradingarrangement,thereareﬁvecommod-
ities traded in each period: consumption, capital, labor,
money, and bonds. The market-clearing conditions for the
ﬁrst four of these commodities are
(31) f(Kt,Nt)=c t+x t
(32) kt−1 = Kt
(33) nt = Nt
(34) mt = Mt.
Since bonds are private assets traded between households,
bonds are in zero net supply. Hence, the bond market-
clearing condition is
(35) bt =0 .
We deﬁne an equilibrium for the monetary trading ar-




such that (i) given these prices, the choice variables of the
householdandtheﬁrmsolvetheirrespectiveproblemsand
(ii) the market-clearing conditions are satisﬁed.
Consider a sequence {pt,it,ct,kt,nt} that satisﬁes the fol-











(40) f(kt−1,nt) + (1−d)kt−1− kt − ct =0
(41) ptct £ Mt−1





With such a sequence, we can use the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst-order
conditions and the market-clearing conditions to ﬁgure out
values for {rt,wt,Kt,Nt} such that {pt,it,ct,kt,nt,rt,wt,Kt,Nt}
is an equilibrium. Consequently, hereafter, when we refer
to an equilibrium, we will be referring to a sequence {pt,
it,ct,kt,nt} that satisﬁes equations (37)–(43).Implementing Optimal Policy
As stated in the introduction, the article is about three
questions: Are zero nominal interest rates both necessary
and sufficient conditions for optimality of monetary pol-
icy? What kinds of monetary policies implement zero
nominal interest rates? And what kinds of monetary pol-
icies uniquely implement zero nominal interest rates? In
this section, we answer these three questions in the fol-
lowing three propositions.
Optimality
The ﬁrst proposition demonstrates that zero nominal inter-
est rates are both necessary and sufficient conditions for
optimality of monetary policy.
PROPOSITION1. Equilibriumquantities arePareto optimal
if and only if it =0for all t.
Proof. Suppose that it = 0 for all t. This fact implies, from
condition (22) of the household’s problem, that lt = lt+1.
This in turn, along with condition (24) of the household’s
problem, implies that µt+1 = 0 for all t. This result, along
with condition (20), implies that in the solution to the
household’s problem,
(44) uc,t+1/buc,t+2 = pt+1/pt+2.
Hence, we have
(45) buc,t+1(fk,t+1+1−d)−u c,t =0
(46) uc,t/ul,t = fn,t.
Our equilibrium thus satisﬁes the optimality conditions
(10)–(13) and so is optimal.
Now suppose that in an equilibrium it ¹ 0 for some t.
Then our optimality condition (11) is not satisﬁed since
(47) ul,t = buc,t+1fn,tpt/pt+1
(48) = uc,tfn,t/(1+it).
In words, the marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure is not equal to the marginal product
of labor. If it ¹ 0, then, quantities are not Pareto optimal.
Q.E.D.
No matter what the tax and transfer scheme is, as long
as interest rates are equal to zero, the equilibrium outcome
satisﬁes (10)–(13) and so is Pareto optimal. What creates
a distortion here is the lag between households’ working
and their being able to use their wage income to buy con-
sumption goods. If nominal interest rates are zero, then
households are indifferent betweenbeing paid today or be-
ingpaid inthefuture,and thedistortionassociatedwiththe
trading arrangement is eradicated.
Implementation
Proposition 1 shows that the Friedman rule is optimal. The
nextpropositionanswersoursecondquestionbycharacter-
izing the set of monetary policy choices that implement
this rule.
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PROPOSITION 2. An equilibrium such that it =0forever
exists if and only if both
(i) lim inft®¥Mt=0
(ii) inftMtb
−t = k >0
are true.
Proof. First, we show that these conditions are sufficient to
guaranteetheexistenceof suchanequilibrium.Westartby
assuming that the money supply satisﬁes the two condi-
tions. Set it = 0, and suppose that pt = b
t−1uc,tp1/uc,1 for all
t > 1, where p1 is a constant to be speciﬁed later. Suppose
that the equilibrium quantities are equal to the sequence
{ct,kt,nt}
¥
t=1 which satisﬁes (10)–(13), where Kt = kt−1 and
Nt = nt. We can set bt = 0 and the input prices to satisfy
(29) and (30). To see that the transversality condition with




tuc,t/pt is constant (because it = 0) and since lim
inft®¥Mt−1 =0 .
To complete the proof of the sufficiency of conditions
(i) and (ii) of Proposition 2, we need to pick p1 so that the
cash-in-advance constraint is always satisﬁed. We know
that the Pareto optimal sequence {ct} converges to a pos-
itive value css. Hence, there is a bound c* such that ct £ c*
for all t. To ensure that the cash-in-advance constraint is
satisﬁed, pick p0 £k/ c *. Then
(50) Mt/(ptct) ³ Mt/(ptc*)=M tb
− t/(p0c*) ³k/(p0c*).
Next we show that Proposition 2’s two conditions are
necessary. First note that if it = 0, then b
tuc,t/pt is constant;
thus, the transversality condition on money can only be
satisﬁed if condition (i) is satisﬁed. Next, to prove the ne-
cessity of (ii), recall from Proposition 1 that if it = 0, then
the equilibrium quantities are determined by (10)–(13);
hence, ct ® css > 0. Therefore, as t goes to inﬁnity,
(51) b
t−1/pt ® uc(c1,n1)/[p1uc(css,nss)].
Because uc(0,n)=¥ , Pareto optimal quantities are always
positive. By combining that result with the fact that ct goes
to a positive limit, we can conclude that ct is bounded
away from zero. Thus, b
−tctpt is bounded from below by
some positive number k. The cash-in-advance constraint
tells us that




which in turn implies condition (ii). Q.E.D.
Proposition2completelycharacterizesthewideclassof
monetary policies for which some equilibrium exhibits ze-
ro nominal interest rates. The key restrictions are on the
long-run behavior of money. Condition (i) says that for
some subsequence of periods {t1,t2,t3,...}, Mtn converges to
0a st ngoes to inﬁnity. Intuition tells us that as long as
condition (i) is satisﬁed, households cannot increase cur-
rent consumption by permanently lowering their money
holdings by a discrete amount. Note that for some mone-
tary policies that satisfy condition (i), real balances may be
growing exponentially (although not faster than interest
rates), and nonetheless, households are at an optimum.
Condition (ii) says that if money falls faster than b asymp-
totically and nominal interest rates are zero, then priceseventually fall at rate b, so the cash-in-advance constraint
will eventually be violated.
The asymptotic restrictions in Proposition 2 have sur-
prisingly little bite for short- or intermediate-run behavior.
Even though the money supply is growing or shrinking at
any rate over any ﬁnite period of time, nominal interest
rates may still always be zero. Moreover, the money sup-
plycanbeoscillatingaperiodicallybetweenanexponential
growth path and an exponential decline path forever, and
nominal interest rates may still always be zero. In any of
these equilibria, the quantity theory is no longer valid be-
cause the behavior of prices over these arbitrarily long
periods of time is dictated solely by the behavior of real
quantities, not by the behavior of money supplies.
In our model, the initial price level is endogenous, but
that assumption is not driving Proposition 2. Suppose the
initial price level were exogenously speciﬁed to be p1.
Then, if nominal rates are to be zero, the entire sequence
of prices is pinned down by the resultant equilibrium con-
dition that uc,tb
t/pt is constant over time. Despite this de-
terminacy of the price level, there is still a large set of
moneysuppliesconsistentwithzeronominalinterestrates.
As long as the money supply is such that the cash-in-ad-
vanceconstraintissatisﬁedineveryperiod,andthemoney
supply converges to zero along some subsequence of pe-
riods (requirements which are not mutually exclusive be-
cause prices are converging to zero over time), the money
supply is consistent with zero nominal interest rates in ev-
ery period. Thus, even with an exogenous initial price lev-
el, there is a large (inﬁnite-dimensional) set of monetary
policies consistent with zero nominal interest rates.
Unique Implementation
Proposition 2 guarantees only that if monetary policy sat-
isﬁes the two conditions, some equilibrium will deliver
zero nominal interest rates. We can easily show that if
Mt+1/Mt = d, where 1 > d > b, another (suboptimal) equi-
librium exists in which the cash-in-advance constraint
binds and nominal rates are positive. As we stressed in the
introduction, we want to be able to uniquely implement
zero nominal interest rates in order to rule out the kinds of
monetary policies which could lead to either optimal or
suboptimal equilibrium quantities. The following proposi-
tion provides a set of monetary policies that uniquely im-
plement zero nominal interest rates (at least when prefer-
ences are logarithmic in consumption).
PROPOSITION 3. Let u(c,l) = ln(c)+v ( l). Suppose that for
some T ³ 1, Mt+1/Mt £bfor all t £ T and Mt+1/Mt = b for
all t > T. Then, in all equilibria, it =0for all t.
Proof. Assume otherwise—that it ¹ 0. If it > 0, then µ t+1 >
0 and pt+1ct+1 = Mt. Since pt+2 £ Mt+1/ct+2, condition (38)
implies that
(53) 1 + it = pt+2ct+2/bpt+1ct+1 £ Mt+1/bMt £ 1
which is a contradiction. Since it ³ 0 (or households would
strictly prefer to borrow in order to hold money), it follows
that it =0 . Q . E . D .
Standard quantity theory logic, along with the Fisher
equation, implies that the way to generate zero nominal
interest rates is for the money supply to shrink at the real
rate of interest. However, Proposition 2 makes clear that
contrary to the simple logic of the quantity theory and the
Fisher equation, this is not the only way to achieve zero




money supply paths (those that feature temporarily faster
rates of shrinkage) will uniquely implement zero rates.
Theseresultsaresurprisingbecausethecash-in-advance
model is widely viewed as providing an intellectual under-
pinning for the quantity theory: in any period in which the
interest rate is positive, the inﬂation rate equals the differ-
encebetweenthegrowthratesofmoneyandconsumption.
We have seen here, though, that this feature fails to hold
exactly when monetary policy is optimal. Along equilibri-
um paths in which nominal interest rates are always zero,
the inﬂation rate is independent of the growth rate of the
money supply—which is hardly consistent with typical
presentations of the quantity theory.
A Puzzle
Nowweconsiderwhathappensifthegovernmentchooses
taxes and transfers so that money shrinks faster than the
rate of discount in every period. We ﬁnd that this situation
presents something of a puzzle since, at least for log utility,
it has no equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 4. If u(c,n) = ln(c)+v ( n ), then if Mt+1/Mt £
d < b for all t, there is no equilibrium.
Proof. If Mt+1/Mt £d<bfor all t, then inftMtb
−t =0 .
Then, from Proposition 2 we know that there is no equi-
librium in which it = 0 for all t. Assume that it >0i n
some period. Note that this implies that µ t > 0 and, hence,
that the cash-in-advance constraint holds with equality in
period t (that is, pt+1ct+1 = Mt):








This contradicts our assumption that it >0 . Q . E . D .
Theintuitionbehindthispropositionissimple.Weknow
that the cash-in-advance constraint does not bind in any
period. If itdid, thenthe nominal interest ratein thatperiod
wouldbeboundedabovebythesumoftherateofdiscount
and the rate of money shrinkage; this sum is negative be-




implies that the cash-in-advance constraint will eventually
be violated.
We call this a puzzle because our (standard) notion of
equilibrium in our (standard) trading arrangement in our
(standard) environment does not tell us what happens for
a wide class of monetary policies that governments might
contemplate using. The question facing researchers is,
What notions of equilibrium, trading arrangements, or en-
vironments should we be examining instead to understand
the effects of these policies?
Concluding Comments
We have shown that in a standard one-sector neoclassical
growth model, in which money is introduced with a cash-in-advance constraint, zero nominal interest rates are op-
timal;andwehavecharacterizedthemonetarypoliciesthat
willimplementzerorates.Surprisingly,wehavefoundthat
the set of such policies is quite large. The only restriction
that these policies must satisfy is that asymptotically mon-
ey shrinks at a rate no greater than the rate of discount.
The intuition behind this result is simple. When the
nominal interest rate is zero, the rate of growth of prices is
pinned down to equal the rate of deﬂation, but individuals
do not care how much real balances they hold, as long as
the amount is at least as large as their consumption needs.
Because the demand for real balances is indeterminate
when interest rates are zero, the set of nominal money sup-
ply paths that intersect with the money demand function at
zero nominal interest rates is large.
Our results can be extended to generalizations of our
physical environment. For example, trivially, they can be
extended to a multisector neoclassical growth model since
none of our results hinge on the existence of a single con-
sumption or capital good. Also, versions of our results can
be obtained for environments in which total factor produc-
tivity is stochastic, though for those environments, the re-
sults do have to be amended to respect the stochastic ver-
sion of the transversality condition.
We have proven our results for a particular monetary
trading arrangement. However, our results apply to any
monetary trading arrangement that satisﬁes the following
satiation property: For any given level of consumption,
there exists a ﬁnite level of real money balances such that
households with real balances above that level are indif-
ferent between using money and bonds as a way of accu-
mulating additional wealth if the two assets earn the same
rateofreturn.Thispropertyholdsforthecash-creditgoods
arrangement considered by Robert Lucas and Nancy Sto-
key (1987); they allow for a type of consumption good
which,likecapital inourmodel,canbepurchased oncred-
it. The satiation property also holds for versions of shop-
ping time models, in which money allows agents to con-
serveontransactioncosts,andmoney-in-the-utility-function
models, in which households derive a direct beneﬁt from
holding money.
Our results should also carry over directly if we extend
the environment to include government debt. Then the
Friedman rule can be interpreted as pegging the interest
rate on government debt to zero. Our characterizations (in
Propositions 2 and 3) of the money supply sequences that
implement and uniquely implement the Friedman rule
apply immediately.
Much of the recent literature concerning the Friedman
rule focuses on environments in which governments must
raisetaxesthroughdistortionarymeans.Theargumentswe
have made about implementing zero nominal interest rates
can be extended to environments with distortionary taxes
if the monetary trading arrangements satisfy the above
satiation property. Of course, zero interest rates will not be
necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal monetary
policy in all such environments. However, V. V. Chari,
Lawrence Christiano, and Patrick Kehoe (1996) consider
the monetary arrangements we have discussed and show
thatzero nominalinterestrates arenecessaryandsufficient
for optimal monetary policy if preferences satisfy certain
homotheticityandseparabilityconditionswhicharegener-
ally considered natural.
*The authors thank Ed Green, Patrick Kehoe, Lee Ohanian, and Warren Weber for
their comments.
1Thecash-in-advance constraint isa commonlyuseddevice tomotivatea demand
for money in otherwise frictionless economic models. It is a feature of models used, for
example, by Robert Clower (1967), Jean Michel Grandmont and Yves Younes (1972),
Charles Wilson (1979), and Robert Lucas (1984).
2We do not explain why households use a trading arrangement with these two re-
strictions. Some informational imperfections can be embedded into the physical envi-
ronment described above to produce the two restrictions; for examples, see the work of
Robert Townsend (1987) and Harold Cole and Alan Stockman (1992). We suspect (but
have not proven) that our results are robust to making these imperfections explicit.
3Wilson (1979) proves a result similar to Proposition 2.
Appendix
Sufficiency of the First-Order
and Transversality Conditions
for Household Optimality
In this appendix, we demonstrate that the ﬁrst-order conditions
andthetransversalityconditionsdescribedintheprecedingpaper
are sufficient for household optimality.
Let {ct,lt} be part of a sequence of vectors that satisfy the
ﬁrst-order conditions and transversality conditions, and suppose
that {c¢ t,l¢ t} gives more utility to the household. Then
(A1) 0 < limT®¥
T
t=1b
t{u(c¢ t,l¢ t)−u ( c t,lt)}
(A2) £ lim infT®¥
T
t=1b
t{uc(ct,lt)(c¢ t−ct)+u l( c t,lt)(l¢ t−lt)}
by concavity;
(A3) = lim infT®¥
T
t=1{lt pt(c¢ t−ct)+l tw t( l¢ t− l t)
+µ tp t( c ¢ t− c t)}




+[ r t+p t(1−d)](k¢ t−1−kt−1)}
+ lt{(mt−m¢ t)+( b t− b ¢ t)
+( k t− k¢ t) p t}
+µ tp t( m ¢ t −1/pt)−(mt−1/pt)]
by the wealth and cash-in-advance constraints;
(A5) = lim infT®¥lT[(mT −m¢ T)+( b T− b ¢ T)+p T( k T− k¢ T)]
by the ﬁrst-order conditions;
(A6) £ lim infT®¥lT[mT+( b T+ B )+k Tp T]
− lim infT®¥l T[m¢ T +( b ¢ T+ B )+k¢ Tp T]
(A7) £ lim infT®¥lT[mT+( b T+ B )+k Tp T]
by the nonnegativity constraints; and
(A8) = 0
bythetransversalitycondition.Thisassumptiongeneratesacon-
tradiction. We can therefore conclude that if a sequence of quan-
tities satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order conditions and the transversality
conditions, then it must be optimal for the household.References
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